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______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
 Gary Vaughn has alleged that his attorney provided him ineffective assistance of 
counsel during the plea-bargaining process, failing to adequately communicate with him 
about the merits of a 60-month plea offer that he ultimately turned down.  The only direct 
evidence of what was discussed about this plea offer comes from dueling affidavits: 
Vaughn says that his attorney did not provide him necessary information, while his 
attorney says that he did.  Because these conflicting accounts do not conclusively resolve 
the factual dispute, the District Court erred by not conducting an evidentiary hearing to 
determine the advice Vaughn’s counsel provided, whether it was deficient, and, if so, 
whether such deficiency caused prejudice.  We will vacate and remand. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A federal grand jury returned an indictment against Vaughn, charging him with 
conspiracy to commit money laundering, conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, mail 
fraud, and the use of a fictitious name in relation to mail fraud, and sought forfeiture of 
the proceeds of his crimes.  From May 2009 to January 2011, he was represented by 
attorney Steven Rice, whose conduct is not at issue in this case.  In January 2011, 
attorney Frank Sluzis took over Vaughn’s representation in this case. 
                                              
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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This case involves two plea deals offered to Vaughn.  In August, 2011, the 
Government offered Vaughn an agreement under which he would plead guilty to 
conspiracy to commit money laundering (Count 1) and conspiracy to commit mail and 
wire fraud (Count 2).  If the District Court accepted the plea, he would receive a 
guaranteed 60-month prison sentence.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) (stating that if 
the parties “agree that a specific sentence . . . is the appropriate disposition of the case,” 
then “such a recommendation or request binds the court once the court accepts the plea 
agreement”).  Ultimately, Vaughn turned down this offer. 
Vaughn and Sluzis’s affidavits provide very different accounts of the 
conversations they had regarding this initial, 60-month offer.  In Vaughn’s affidavit, he 
claimed that Sluzis refused to tell him what his sentence exposure would be if he were to 
go to trial, saying that “he only practiced in facts not fairy tales and further that he 
practiced in guarantees not what ifs.”  App. 192.  Vaughn stated that because he could not 
gauge the benefit of the plea deal, he did not accept it.  In contrast, Sluzis’s affidavit 
stated that he provided Vaughn with calculations as to the likely Guidelines range, 
estimating that the Guidelines range for Count 1 would be 57-71 months and the range 
for Count 2 would be 78-97 months.1  He stated that he discussed the offer at length with 
Vaughn. 
                                              
1 At one point in his brief, Vaughn recounts that Sluzis provided this Guidelines 
estimate, citing to Sluzis’s affidavit.  But counsel clarified at argument that he believed 
he was obligated to restate the facts as the District Court had found them.  Accordingly, 
we do not take this to be a concession.  
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The government offered another plea deal in November, 2011.  Again, Vaughn 
would plead guilty to Counts 1 and 2, but this time, there would be no binding 
recommendation as to sentencing.  Vaughn accepted this second plea offer.  Vaughn 
alleges in his affidavit that Sluzis pushed him to accept this deal, and told Vaughn that 
the judge ‘hinted’ that he would sentence him below the guidelines.  App. 193.  He also 
again alleged that Sluzis refused to explain to him the alternative to taking the deal or the 
worst-case outcome of proceeding to trial.   
The District Court held a change-of-plea hearing in accordance with Vaughn’s 
new desire to plead guilty.  At this hearing, Vaughn testified, under oath, that he had gone 
over the charges and the plea deal with Sluzis.  Vaughn also testified that he agreed with 
the Government’s summary of the plea agreement, which was recited at the hearing, and 
understood that the court was free to sentence him up to the statutory maximums, which 
were twenty and five years for the two counts, respectively.  At the same hearing, Sluzis 
stated that he had provided Vaughn with a Guidelines estimate of 57-71 months for 
Count 1 and 78-97 months for Count 2.  The District Court accepted Vaughn’s guilty plea 
for both counts.2 
The United States Probation Office thereafter prepared a Presentence Investigation 
Report (“PSR”).  The PSR stated that Vaughn’s base offense level was 6, and that the 
following enhancements applied: (1) a 16-level increase applied under U.S.S.G. 
§ 2B1.1(b)(1)(I) because Vaughn’s conduct caused a loss of more than $1,000,000 and 
                                              
2 Pursuant to the plea agreement, Vaughn also agreed to forfeit $900,000, as 
provided for in the indictment. 
5 
 
less than $2,500,000; (2) a two-level increase applied under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i) 
because the offense involved 10 or more victims; (3) a two-level increase applied under 
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(4) because Vaughn was in the business of receiving and selling 
stolen property; and (4) a four-level increase applied under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) because 
Vaughn was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more 
participants.  The PSR also recommended that Vaughn not receive credit for accepting 
responsibility for his crimes because, though he pleaded guilty, the letter he submitted 
minimized his conduct.  As a result, the PSR concluded that Vaughn’s total offense level 
was 30, and his criminal history category was IV, which resulted in an advisory 
sentencing Guidelines range of 135-68 months’ imprisonment. 
Sluzis at first objected to only one aspect of the PSR—whether Vaughn accepted 
responsibility—prompting Vaughn to hire new counsel to provide a second opinion on 
the proper calculation of the loss and forfeiture amounts.  Based on that advice, Sluzis 
added another objection to the PSR, prompting the Government to agree to reduce the 
loss amount.  This led to a new Guidelines Range of 92-115 months.   
Emails sent by Vaughn to Sluzis after the PSR was received provide further 
evidence that Sluzis and Vaughn had discussed the likely sentencing effects of Vaughn 
pleading guilty to the final plea offer.  Vaughn complained, for example, that “You said 
that Judge Jones would sentence me far below the guidelines of which you stated were 
48-72 months. . . . It doesn’t seem that we are even close to that now.”  App. 282.   
At sentencing, Sluzis sought probation.  The Government recommended 
sentencing within the 92-115 months range.  The District Court sustained both of 
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Vaughn’s objections, and further decided to vary downwards, finding the Guidelines still 
to be “a bit of an overreach,” considering the amount of loss.  App. 159.  Ultimately, the 
District Court imposed concurrent terms of seventy-two months’ imprisonment on Count 
1 and sixty months on Count 2, as well as three years’ supervised release, and forfeiture 
of $900,000. 
About a year later, Vaughn filed a motion to vacate or correct his sentence under 
28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming that Sluzis provided ineffective assistance of counsel during 
the plea-bargaining and sentencing processes.  The District Court denied the motion 
without a hearing,3 finding that Sluzis’s affidavit was corroborated by the record of the 
plea hearing and that Vaughn was informed of the consequences of rejecting the first plea 
offer when he did so. 
Vaughn filed a notice of appeal, and this Court granted a certificate of 
appealability on two sets of issues.  First, we granted a certificate of appealability on 
Vaughn’s claims that Sluzis was ineffective for failing to adequately advise him of the 
benefits of the first, 60-month plea offer, including whether the District Court should 
have held an evidentiary hearing on this claim.  Second, we granted a certificate of 
appealability with respect to Vaughn’s claim that Sluzis ought to have objected to the 
District Court’s application of four sentencing enhancements.  We denied a certificate of 
appealability on all other claims, including Vaughn’s claims regarding the forfeiture of 
                                              
3 Notably, through much of the litigation in the District Court, the Government 
stated that an evidentiary hearing would be necessary on Vaughn’s ineffective assistance 
claims. 
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$900,000.  Thus, Sluzis’s advice with respect to the final, accepted plea offer is not at 
issue in this appeal. 
II. JURISDICTION 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.   
III. ANALYSIS 
Vaughn’s primary contention on appeal is that the District Court erred by failing 
to hold an evidentiary hearing before it ruled on his claim that Sluzis provided ineffective 
assistance of counsel with respect to the first, 60-month plea offer, which he had 
rejected.4  A district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing in a habeas proceeding is 
                                              
4 Vaughn also claims that Sluzis was ineffective for failing to object to the 
application of four sentencing enhancements.  These objections would have been 
frivolous in light of the record and thus Sluzis was not deficient for failing to pursue 
them.  In addition, Vaughn was not prejudiced by the failure to object because the 
objections lack merit and hence would not have changed the resulting Guidelines 
calculations.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).  First, with respect 
to the loss amount, Sluzis filed an objection to the loss calculation that the District Court 
sustained, which resulted in a loss amount of between $400,000 and $1,000,000 and 
reduced his offense level by two from that recommended in the PSR.  Moreover, there is 
no non-frivolous basis for Vaughn to argue for a further reduction since, at the plea 
hearing, Vaughn confirmed that the Government could prove that he laundered at least 
$531,000 from the sales of stolen property.   
Second, Vaughn has presented no basis to conclude that the two-level increase to 
his offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(4) was improper.  The enhancement applies 
to offenses that involve 10 or more victims, and the PSR identified 26 victims. 
Third, because receiving and selling stolen property was at the heart of Vaughn’s 
criminal conduct and Vaughn admitted as much during the plea hearing, it would have 
been futile for Sluzis to object to the application of a two-level enhancement under 
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(4) for being “in the business of receiving and selling stolen 
property.” 
Finally, at his plea hearing, Vaughn acknowledged that he “solicit[ed] and 
enlist[ed] numerous runners,” App. 77, 81, which established that he was an organizer or 
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reviewed for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Bui, 795 F.3d 363, 366 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(citing United States v. Lilly, 536 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008)).  However, 28 U.S.C. § 
2255(b) mandates that the court hold an evidentiary hearing “[u]nless the motion and the 
files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.”  
Thus, the District Court is obligated to—and abuses its discretion if it does not—hold a 
hearing if the habeas petition “allege[s] any facts warranting relief under § 2255 that are 
not clearly resolved by the record.”  United States v. Tolliver, 800 F.3d 138, 141 (3d Cir. 
2015) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Booth, 432 F.3d 542, 546 (3d Cir. 
2005).  In assessing whether a hearing is necessary, the court “must accept the truth of the 
movant’s factual allegations unless they are clearly frivolous on the basis of the existing 
record.”  Id. (quoting Booth, 432 F.3d at 545). 
Vaughn seeks relief based upon Sluzis’s allegedly ineffective assistance in failing 
to discuss his sentence exposure at the time of the 60-month plea offer.  The Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee of effective counsel extends to plea bargaining, Lafler v. 
Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012), including to plea offers that were rejected, Missouri v. 
Frye, 566 U.S. 133 (2012).5  Claims of ineffective assistance during plea bargaining are 
analyzed under the familiar two-part Strickland standard, requiring performance below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and prejudice.  Lafler, 566 U.S. at 162-63.   
                                                                                                                                                  
leader of a criminal activity that involved at least five participants, warranting a four-
level increase under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). 
5 This is unaffected by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lee v. United 
States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017).  That opinion addresses the standard when a plea is 
accepted due to an attorney’s incompetence, not when it is rejected.  Id. at 1965 & n.1. 
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To effectively assist their clients in the plea bargaining process, counsel must 
provide defendants facing a potential guilty plea “enough information ‘to make a 
reasonably informed decision whether to accept a plea offer.’”  Bui, 795 F.3d at 367 
(quoting Shotts v. Wetzel, 724 F.3d 364, 376 (3d Cir. 2013)).  We have previously 
identified one particularly important piece of information for that decision: “Knowledge 
of the comparative sentence exposure between standing trial and accepting a plea offer 
will often be crucial to the decision whether to plead guilty.”  United States v. Day, 969 
F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1992).  This obligates counsel not only to communicate the statutory 
maximums and minimums, but also requires counsel “to know the Guidelines.”  Bui, 795 
F.3d at 367 (quoting United States v. Smack, 347 F.3d 533, 538 (3d Cir. 2003)).  That 
said, counsel’s obligations to explain possible sentencing outcomes are not all-
encompassing.  Counsel need not provide “anything approaching a detailed exegesis of 
the myriad arguably relevant nuances of the Guidelines,” Day, 969 F.2d at 43, nor must 
she give “an exact number or close estimate of the maximum sentencing exposure.”  
Shotts, 724 F.3d at 376.   
Under this standard, Vaughn’s allegations—if taken as true—would mean that 
Sluzis’s performance was deficient.  Vaughn contends that Sluzis refused entirely to 
communicate his likely Guidelines exposure and thereby denied him the information he 
needed to make an informed decision whether to accept the first plea deal.  We must take 
these allegations as true unless the record shows them to be “clearly frivolous.”  As the 
Government admitted at argument, the record only provides two accounts of what 
Vaughn and Sluzis discussed at the time the 60-month offer was on the table: Vaughn’s 
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and Sluzis’s.  It is one person’s word against another—hardly a clear resolution on the 
face of the record—and precisely the sort of contested situation in which an evidentiary 
record is necessary to resolve disputed facts. 
The District Court erred by pointing to the “sworn statements made by the 
Defendant at his change of plea hearing” as probative of what counsel had told Vaughn.  
App. 441.  At that hearing, Vaughn testified that Sluzis had explained the legal effect of 
the plea hearing, and such statements “carry a strong presumption of verity” that 
“constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings.”  Blackledge v. 
Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977).6  But those statements were made at the hearing that 
concerned the plea offer that Vaughn actually accepted, not the 60-month offer that he 
turned down.  At the hearing, Vaughn was not asked, and did not testify, about his 
conversations with Sluzis about the earlier 60-month offer, which by that point was no 
longer relevant.7  The emails between Vaughn and Sluzis, sent after Vaughn pled guilty, 
likewise do not clarify anything about what was said during the relevant time period: 
when the 60-month offer was on the table.  Thus, the record does not conclusively 
                                              
6 Vaughn’s hearing testimony also does not render his entire affidavit non-
credible, even if it conflicts with the parts of his affidavit concerning the final, accepted 
plea offer.  Where a witness offers false testimony, the finder of fact may, or may not, 
disregard the rest of his testimony.  Cf. Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 256 (3d Cir. 
2004) (endorsing “falsus in uno” jury charge).  Put differently, disregarding Vaughn’s 
entire affidavit requires a credibility determination, but the court must accept the truth of 
Vaughn’s allegations in determining whether to hold an evidentiary hearing.   
7 The District Court also referred to our decision in United States v. Shedrick, 493 
F.3d 292, 300 (3d Cir. 2007) which held that “any erroneous sentencing information 
allegedly provided by defense counsel was corrected by the written plea agreement and 
the detailed in-court plea colloquy, both of which accurately stated [defendant’s] 
potential sentence.”  For the same reason, Shedrick is immaterial here.  Vaughn had 
already turned down the 60-month offer when the later plea hearing was held.  
11 
 
resolve what advice Sluzis gave Vaughn, suggesting that an evidentiary hearing should 
have been held.   
In addition, the District Court did not address the prejudice prong of Vaughn’s 
ineffective assistance claim, as it concluded that there was no deficient performance.  In 
this context, to show prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that he 
would have accepted the favorable offer but for the ineffective advice of his counsel, that 
the district court would have accepted the plea, and that “the conviction or sentence, or 
both, under the offer’s terms would have been less severe than under the judgment and 
sentence that in fact were imposed.”  Lafler, 566 U.S. at 164.  It is clear that Vaughn’s 
ultimate 72-month sentence was more severe than the 60-month offer he rejected: one 
element of the three-part definition of prejudice under Lafler.  The District Court did not 
address the other aspects of prejudice, namely whether there is a reasonable probability 
that both Vaughn and the Court would have accepted the 60-month offer.  Accordingly, 
we will remand to the District Court for it to provide a prejudice analysis in the first 
instance. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Vaughn has alleged that Sluzis’s performance was deficient for failing to 
adequately communicate with him about the 60-month offer, and the record does not 
conclusively resolve the relevant factual disputes on this issue.  We therefore remand to 
the District Court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the advice Sluzis provided, 
whether it was deficient, and if it was, whether Vaughn can show prejudice as set forth in 
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Lafler.  We affirm the District Court’s judgment concerning the application of four 
sentencing enhancements.   
